The methodologies employed by FAD, the World Bank, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to quantify the extent of global hunger during the past 50 years are examined. The methodologies are shown to be less than perfect and to contain built-in biases favoring exaggeration. They have also proved amenable to manipulation by those with a political agenda to pursue. Other approaches to measuring world hunger should therefore be sought. It is the policy of Cornell University actively to support .equality of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be denied admission to any educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited dis crimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. Until recently evidence on changes in nutritional well-being was largely anthropometric. That the average American soldier in 1941 had been better fed than his counterparts in 1917, 1898, and 1861 could reasonably be inferred from the larger uniforms the Army was obliged to supply him; and that few of us could squeeze into the medieval suits of armor on display in museums is strong evidence that things have improved since the Middle Ages. Only in the last half century have other data come into existence that might lay the foundation for more precise quantification. These, however, must be handled with care if they are not to be seriously misleading.
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Figure 2.1. Persons Identified as Nutritionally Deficient in Selected World Hunger Assessments
The Early Analytical Approach
The analytical approach followed in the FAO's first two World Food Surveys and the two World Food Budgets prepared by the USDA was simple in the extreme and may be summarized by the following equation:
Food available
Average daily Loss for human consumption < recommended nutrient allowance >
X population allowances
To determine whether or not a country was experiencing a food problem, apparent per capita food availabilities were set against estimates of per capita nutrient needs. Where and when availabilities exceeded requirements, all was presumed well; where they did not, the country's or region's entire population was considered to be
• inadequately nourished.
The failings of this approach are several and, when probed, obvious. First, it assumes that societies are sufficiently homogeneous in their food habits for average data to have meaning. This is certainly not the case in developed economies, where differences in income, locality, ethnic background, and place within the household have long been known to have marked effects on food behavior; and it is now recognized to be no less invalid for the developing world. A further drawback of the approach is that it presupposed an ability to specify average food availabilities and needs with a fair degree of precision.
Problems of Estimating Food Availabilities
To estimate food availabilities for a region or country one must construct a food balance sheet. This is the .-basic accounting tool of the food economist, and like its counterpart in the business world, it summarizes the situation as of a particular point in time, usually a year or average of years. Commodity by commodity, the supply of food is set against utilization. Included on the supply side are measurements of production, trade, and stock changes, and on the utilization side, seed, feed, and industrial nonfood use, waste up to the retail level, processing losses, and the amount actually available for human consumption, all in terms of physical quantities. These values are then converted into per capita availability of calories l of dietary energy, grams of protein, and appropriate measures of other nutrients. In global estimates, typically only calories and protein are considered. In theory each of the nine components is derived separately; in practice this is possible for only a few industrial countries possessing uncommonly sophisticated reporting procedures and even then imperfectly. In most countries the practice is to estimate availabilities for human consumption not independently, but as a residual. It thus reflects the sum of the failings of the other eight balance sheet components.
The error so introduced is almost invariably in the direction of understatement. Understatement of production is a characteristic of most newly developed agricultural reporting systems. Wheat production in the United States is now recognized to have been 30 to 40 percent above that officially reported during the first decade (1866-75) of the USDA's statistical efforts (Working 1926:260) . In Mexico the comparable figure for maize during 1925-34, the Direccion General de Economia Rural's first decade, was over 50 percent (Poleman 19n:16, 19) .
To this very understandable tendency can be added the further complications that:
• The statistical officer in developing countries is frequently (and not irrationally) equated with the tax collector by the farmer, whose response will be to minimize.
• Output which is not seen is not counted, and where communications are poor a great deal is not seen.
• Much food production is for on-farm consumption and does not pass through commercial channels where it might be monitored.
• In tropical areas especially, many food crops are not grown in pure stands but mix-planted in fields of bewildering complexity.
There can, of course, be errors of overstatement. These most commonly trace to the exuberance of field staff who feel under pressure to report outstanding results--the classic case in point occurred in China during the Great Leap Forward of 1957-59; grain output supposedly jumped from 185 to 375 million tons in one incredible year (Jones and Poleman 1962 :4)--or to governments which for political reasons wish to deny conditions of crisis, as in Ethiopia during the draught years of the early 1970s. But on balance such instances are the exception rather than the rule.
Compared to the problems of estimating production, those relating to the other two components of the balance sheet's supply side are negligible. Stocks--on-farm stocks in particular--are, to be sure, difficult to measure, but the problem of year-to-year changes in carryovers can be minimized by preparing an average -1 A calorie is the amount of heat needed to raise a gram of water 1° Centigrade; the large Calorie, written with capital letter, or kilocalorie is the amount required to raise a kilogram of water. It is the kilocalorie in which human energy needs or expenditures are commonly expressed and the capital C is popularly dispensed with. Here it will be written either as "kcal" or "calorie." balance sheet for a three-or five-year period. The trade figure is usually quite accurate, unless, as in Africa, international boundaries cut rather arbitrarily between traditional trading partners.
On the utilization side the various deductions between gross supplies and availabilities for human consumption tend to reflect whatever error has found its way into the production estimates. This is because seed, waste, and processing losses are usually calculated as percentages of production. Quantities fed to livestock or given over to industrial nonfood uses are still modest in many developing countries.
To generalize about the extent to which food availabilities in the developing countries have been and are now understated is not easy. A reasonable assumption is that the accuracy of production estimates has improved with time, that the extent of understatement is now less than it was when FAO published its f11'st World Food Survey in 1946, and that some of the apparent gains recorded in food availabilities are spurious. But the opposite may well have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa. There independence has frequently been accompanied by a deterioration in the reporting systems established by colonial administrators. When perfection may be anticipated is anybody's guess. It was not until 1902, 36 years after the effort began, that the USDA began reporting wheat output with an acceptable margin of error; and not until the mid-1950s, with 30 years experience in hand, was Mexico able to confidently measure its maize harvest.
Detailed studies of the food economies of Malaysia and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) carried out in the 1960s suggested that energy availabilities in both were officially understated by from 10 to 15 percent (Purvis 1966; Jogaratnam and Poleman 1%9) . As the staple in both countries is rice grown under irrigated conditions and thus relatively amenable to quantification, and as both countries have by the standards of the developing world an admirable statistical tradition, this 10-15 percent is probably something of a floor. Elsewhere the amount of food actually available may still be undercounted by rather more.
Problems of Estimating Food Requirements
Compounding this tendency to undercount food availabilities have been the difficulties associated with estimating food needs. Until recently these have been overstated. Nutrition is still a young science and our ability to establish minimal or desirable levels of intake is not nearly as precise as we would like it to be. A person's nutritional needs are a function of many things: age, sex, body size, activity patterns, health status, and individual makeup are the more important. Conceptually, knowing these variables, it should be possible to set minimum levels of intake for protein, energy, vitamins, and other nutrients sufficient to preclude overt deficiency disease in most of a population. As a practical matter, it is not and what were used as surrogates for such minimal criteria in the early hunger evaluations were the recommended allowances prepared as guidelines for dietitians and other nutritional workers. These allowances consciously err on the side of caution, both to incorporate a comfortable safety margin and to ensure that the substantial variations in food needs among individuals will be covered.
The recommended allowances are periodically modified and from the direction and magnitude of change it is possible to infer something of the probable extent by which minimum needs were overstated in the past. With respect to energy allowances, the history of the FAO, the United States Food and Nutrition Board, and other responsible organizations has been one of continued downward modification. The energy allowance for the U.S. "reference manno-in his twenties, weighing 70 kilograms, and not very active--dropped by 500 kcal. between 1953 and 1974, after which the practice of suggesting a single figure for persons of the same sex, age, and weight was sensibly replaced by one more cognizant of individual variations in activity levels (Table 2 .1).
Apart from undue initial conservatism, the principal cause of this reduction is the increasingly inactive character of life in industrial societies. Physical effort is less and less demanded on the job and the body moves from place to place less on its feet than on its seat. It is not unlikely that the energy allowances suggested for the developed countries are now quite reasonable. Little remains to be understood of how urban man divides his day--it has become after all depressingly routinized--and, thanks to studies carried out in association with b Calculated on basis of activity level wartime rationing programs in the United Kingdom and Germany, the energy costs of most activities are known (Table 2 .2).
The same is not true for developing countries. Very few energy expenditure/activity studies have been conducted among rural or urban people in these regions and useful common denominators are available for only a few tasks. A key reason for this shortcoming is the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on energy expenditure. The traditional method for doing this is to record the energy costs of specific activities with a respirometer and then multiply the resulting factors by appropriate time spans. The problems are many. The respirometer is a clumsy instrument, not unlike an army field pack with a gas mask attached; it can be kept on a subject for only a few minutes and its presence is hardly conducive to normal behavior. Moreover, time span recording must be meticulously accurate in order to be useful. To obtain such information under primitive conditions without an impetus similar to wartime rationing is probably asking too much of the research priorities of most less-developed countries.
"
In response to criticism that the energy allowances used in its early World Food Surveys were unrealistic surrogates for minimum needs, the FAG employed a different approach to establishing floor criteria in its report to the 1974 World Food Conference (United Nations 1974b) and continued this in its Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth World Food Surveys (FAG 1977; FAG 1987 , FAG 1996 . This was to estimate requirements of the average -nonfasting person at 1.5 X his Basal Metabolic Rate and to assume that some individuals might have a BMR as much as 20 percent below the norm.
It is difficult to fault this modification. Certainly the 1.2 BMR factor which' results--.8 X 1.5 (BMR)--yields values which bear a clearer hallmark of reality. If anything, it errs on the side of being too low. Applied to South and Southeast Asia it suggests minimum per capita requirements somewhat below 1,500 kcal., as opposed to the criteria of 2,600 and 2,230-2,300 kcal., respectively, used in the frrst two World Food Surveys (FAD 1987:68) .
As an alternative, FAD also employed a 1.4 BMR factor in its Fifth World Food Survey. This had the effect of raising the number of persons classified as inadequately nourished from 335 million to 494 million (FAD 1987:22) . In its documentation for the 1992 International Conference on Nutrition FAD raised the factor to 1.54 BMR (FAD 1992:7-8) ; and increased it further to 1.55 BMR for males and 1.56 BMR for females in its Sixth World Food Survey (FAD 1996:143) . The result of the latter two modifications was to increase the number reported to be hungry to 786 million and 841 million, respectively (International Conference on Nutrition 1992:v; FAD 1996:45). That such modest modifications in assumption can have so mighty an impact on the number of persons said to be inadequately nourished serves to emphasize the fragility of the hunger quantification methodology employed by FAD even today. In the early FAD and USDA studies, the terms "undernourishment" ("undernutrition") and "malnourishment" ("malnutrition") were widely used. Undernourishment is generally taken to mean a shortfall in energy intake such that a person cannot maintain normal bodily activity without losing weight.
Malnourishment, on the other hand, describes the lack or deficiency of one or more of the so-called protective nutrients--protein, the vitamins, and minerals.
The first two World Food Surveys defmed the nutritional problems of the developing world largely in terms of energy shortfalls and undernourishment. In the Third World Food Survey insufficient protein availabilities and malnourishment were highlighted. Today most nutritionists concerned with the developing countries speak of protein-calorie (or protein-energy) malnutrition. This sees a shortage of energy again as the prime problem and takes into account that an apparent adequacy of protein can be converted into a deficit should a portion of it be metabolized to compensate for insufficient energy intake. This major change in problem perception and terminology coincided with a drastic reduction in the recommended minimum allowances for protein.
As with energy allowances, the early FAO protein recommendation contained a comfortable safety factor as well as an allowance to take individual variation into account. In 1971 an expert panel concluded that these had been excessive and reduced the daily per capita recommendation for adults by a third: from 61 grams of reference protein to 40 (FAO Food Policy and Nutrition Division 1973:2).
The effect of this change was dramatic. Prior to the revision, simple comparisons of average availabilities and needs suggested that almost all the world's developing countries were deficient in protein; after it,hardly any of them. If the "protein gap" did not disappear overnight, its statistical underpinnings seemed to.
Misleading Conclusions
Since they used food availability estimates that understated to compare against food requirement figures that overstated, it is not surprising that the early global food assessments painted a gloomy picture of world hunger. The picture conveyed was one of hungry countries and of a world unable to feed its rapidly growing population. Insufficient production was seen as the problem. As the second of the USDA's World Food Budgets put it (l964:iii-iv): Two-thirds of the world's people live in countries with nutritionally inadequate national average diets ... The diet-deficit countries are poor and food deficiencies merely reflect the low level of income in general... The basic problem of the diet-deficit countries is one of productivity. The people cannot produce enough food to feed themselves or produce enough other products to buy the food they require. Food production has barely been able to keep ahead of population growth, much less provide for the expanded demand resulting from some improvement in per capita income most of which goes for food.
We now know that such conclusions seriously distorted reality. Redone with truly accurate food availability and requirement figures it is probable that the early methodology would have classified few countries as "diet deficit." Further, the subsequent record of agricultural productivity in the less-developed countries has been quite impressive. Indeed, according to the widely used indices of global food output issued by the USDA and FAO (Figure 2 .2) the developing countries have expanded production rather more rapidly than the developed onessignificantly so during the 1980s, when saturated markets constrained farmers in the United States. Population growth, to be sure, absorbed much of the gains--some of which no doubt reflected nothing more than improved statistical coverage--but with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa per capita improvement is evident.
.'
There have, of course, been year-to-year fluctuations about this level and twice the rate of progress seemed to falter. As each time this gave rise to a spate of pessimistic pronouncements about the world's ability to feed itself, it is worth examining the causes. The first pause came in the mid-l960s and resulted almost entirely from two successive droughts in India. Indian production bulks so large in the developing countries aggregate that -major fluctuations in its output influence visibly the index for all countries. Conditioned to think of the developing world as hungry and hearing of massive food aid shipments--of the 30 million tons of grain shipped by the United States under Public Law 480 during the two years ending in June 1%7, half went to India--the casual observer was receptive to forecasts of imminent global starvation. One author went so far as to specify 1975 as the year in which this would take place (Paddock and Paddock 1%7 The factors underlying the second pause--the "World Food Crisis" of the early 1970s--had little to do with the developing world. In brief, it resulted from an unfortunate coincidence of several influences affecting the major trading countries: an intentional running down of stocks and limiting production in the United States; unprecedented prosperity and rising demand for feed imports in Japan and Europe; and unfavorable weather in the Soviet Union. The role of Russia was particularly destabilizing. The failure of its 1972 harvest triggered a run on world supplies--it no longer being politically feasible for the Soviets to mask their agricultural failings behind belt tightening--and for the first time since the Korean conflict the long-term decline in food prices was reversed (Figure 2. 3).
Save for continuing difficulties in the former Soviet bloc of countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, and intentional cutbacks and weather induced shortfalls in the United states, the trend in production has been upward almost everywhere since the mid-1970s. The secular decline in global food prices has been resumed, and an extension of the irrigated area in India seems to have insulated that country from vagaries in the weather. The failure of the monsoon in 1987 resulted in only a marginal (five percent) drop in Indian grain production, and accumulated reserves were more than adequate to tide over the shortfall, which was more than made up for by gains in the 1988 harvest. Progress in China can only be described as phenomenal; the first 15 years following the market reforms of 1978 saw grain production increase from c. 250 million tons to over 400 million. Although some have perceived the upturn in the quantity of grain moving from North America to the developing world as a sign that the latter continues to be in trouble, this interpretation is incorrect. The great bulk of the increase is not going as food to the poorest countries, but as feed to those middle-income countries whose populations are becoming sufficiently affluent to effectively demand more meat in their diet.
If this story of steady progress in the less-developed countries does not tally with the pessimism of the early hunger assessments, it does not follow that the post-war years have witnessed a reduction in the number of people nutritionally distressed. For the suggestion that increased production alone could eliminate hunger was only one of the misconceptions conveyed by early studies. , ,,'" .. '......, .. ... as a very conservative estimate some 20 percent of the people in the underdeveloped areas are undernourished and 60 percent are malnourished. Experience shows that the majority of the undernourished are also malnourished. It is believed therefore... some 60 percent of the people in the underdeveloped areas comprising some two thirds of the world's population suffer from undernutrition or malnutrition or both. This, of course, was before the recommended allowances for protein were lowered; with revision, the 60 percent malnourished presumably disappeared. Dn the other hand, Dr. Sukhatme's 20 percent undernourished is identical to FAD's current estimate of the proportion of persons in the developing world suffering protein calorie deprivation.
.'
In its documentation prepared for discussion at the World Food Conference of November 1974 (United Nations 1974b) the FAD took due account of the 1971 reduction in protein allowances and also employed the 1.2 BMR criterion for minimum energy needs for the first time. Though this yielded floor values well below the energy requirement figures used by Dr. Sukhatme--1,500 as opposed to 2,300 kcals. for the Far East--the proportion of the developing world's population whose estimated intake fell below it somehow rose from 20 to 25 percent (United Nations 1974b:66).
The FAD offered no explanation as to how this increase came about, but -the evidence strongly suggests the figures were derived less through research than through a political decision imposed from on high. The findings would appear to contain a suspicious element of arbitrariness. I confess to similar skepticism regarding the fmdings of the six subsequent attempts to measure the impact of income. Although they employed broadly similar analytical techniques, the two studies published in the mid 1970s--the FAD's Fourth World Food Survey (1977) and the World Bank's Malnutrition and Poverty came to wildly different conclusions. The FAD report concluded that about 450 million people were suffering from protein-calorie malnutrition (FAD 1977:53) ; the World Bank put the number at almost 1.2 billion (Reutlinger and Selowsky 1976:2) . Shortly after the two studies appeared, President Carter appointed his Commission on World Hunger (1980) . Not knowing what to do about this discrepancy in the magnitude of the problem it was supposed to investigate, the Commission mentioned both figures in its report (Presidential Commission on World Hunger 1980:16) .
Central to the analysis in both studies was the concept of calorie-income elasticity; that is, of the increment in caloric intake associated with an increment in income. The elasticity or elasticities used by the FAD were not stated; the World Bank study postulated a range of from .10 to .30 for people just meeting their minimal food needs. Although the reasons for its selection were not specified, a calorie-income elasticity of .15 was deemed most appropriate, and on the basis of it and some heroic assumptions about income distribution in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, the study concluded (Reutlinger and Selowsky 1976:2): ... that 56 percent of the population in developing countries (some 840 million people) had calorie deficient diets in excess of 250 calories a day. Another 19 percent (some 290 million people) had deficits of less than 250 calories a day.
There are a number of reasons for giving minimal credence to the resulting figure of almost 1.2 billion hungry people. The World Bank analysts were apparently unaware of the tendency for food production in developing countries to be underreported; and unlike the FAD, which used the 1.2 BMR benchmark, they continued to employ recommended dietary allowances as surrogates for minimal needs. The latter error was corrected in the Bank's subsequent Poverty and Hunger, published in 1986, with the result that it dropped the number of persons said to be nutritionally deprived to between 340 million and 730 million, depending on whether 80 or 90 percent of energy needs was used as the benchmark (Reutlinger and Pellekaan 1986:17) . FAD's Fifth World Food Survey, which appeared a year earlier, had the range running from 335 million (1.2 BMR) to 494 million (1.4 BMR) (FAD 1987:22) .
By raising the minimum energy criterion to 1.54 BMR FAD was able to increase the estimate of persons chronically undernourished to 786 million in the documentation used at its 1992 International Conference on Nutrition (FAD 1992:8-9) ; and to 841 million in The Sixth World Food Survey by increasing it further to 1.55 BMR for males and 1.56 BMR for females (FAD 1996:45 What, then, of these attempts to incorporate the impact of income on hunger quantification? After almost 50 years at the task, is the international bureaucracy in a position to give us reasonable estimates of the extent of global hunger? Unfortunately, no--even assuming the system could be freed of self-serving exaggeration. Even if we accept that food production save in Africa may now be quantified with a fair degree of accuracy in -most of the developing world and that the 1.2-1.56 BMR range probably contains a reasonable approximation of minimal energy needs, serious problems remain with the measurement of income distribution and the concept of calorie-income elasticity. While the concept itself is valid, it misleads by suggesting that the relationship between income changes and changes in energy intake may be reduced to one tidy figure. Not the least of the limitations of such a notion is the implication that the richer one gets the more calories one ingests. Visions are conjured up, not just of skeleton-thin poor, but of 400-pound millionaires.
The reader also comes away from the studies with the impression that the income-hunger relationship is a simple one, amenable to clear-cut evaluation. This is not the case. Figure 2 .4, which summarizes the effect income had on nutrient intake in Sri Lanka two decades ago is sugges tive of the real world. The household budget survey on which it is based was then almost unique. It covered almost 10,000 households representative of the entire country and was conducted and analyzed with uncommon integrity. Yet, even with this survey, one can infer little about the extent of protein-. calorie malnutrition. The most impor tant dietary adjustment associated with rising income is a decline in the importance of the starchy staple foods -read rice in southern Asia--as sources of energy and a shift to the more expensive, flavorous foods such as meat, fish, and vegetables. In Sri Lanka this tendency is observable among only the four uppermost income classes (20 percent of the population), and then, because of egalitarian measures imposed by the government, only weakly so. Between the lowest class (43 percent of the people) and the next lowest (37 per cent), the sole change is quantitative. There is a difference in apparent per capita daily availabilities of 200 calo ries and 10 grams of protein, but none in diet composition. What are we to infer from this? Because increased quantity not quality was purchased with increased income, the 2oo-calorie jump could be interpreted as implying behavior consistent with enforced reduced activity among the very poor (or actual physical deterioration) and that a 1.2-1.54 BMR energy floor range of 1,500-1,850 kcal. is an unrealistically low for minimum energy needs in Sri Lanka. But just as reasonably, one might accept the 1.2-1.54 BMR floor range and postulate caloric adequacy among that element of society which is too poor to waste anything and which, given the very high rate of unemployment then in Sri Lanka, leads a less active life and therefore has lower energy needs. Thus it is possible to have it either way: depending on your assumptions, you can prove beyond a statistical doubt that 43 percent of Ceylonese suffer protein-calorie malnutrition or none do.
Clearly, an alternative approach to hunger quantification is called for.
